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FELIX FALLIBILITAS: 
THE BENEFIT OF SIN'S POSSIBILITY IN 
KIERKEGAARD'S THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY 
Jason A. Mahn 
This paper argues that anxiety, fallibility, and the possibility of sin can be used 
by a person to move past moral innocence and toward mature religious faith. 
I argue that the conflicting rhetorical voices in Kierkegaard's The Concept of 
Anxiety should prevent interpreters such as Philip Quinn and Gregory Be-
about from claiming that anxiety functions to explain sin. Anxiety more prop-
erly and paradoxically functions to develop faith. By adopting Kierkegaard's 
commendation of the "fortune of fallibility," Christian theology is able to find 
in anxiety not only the occasion to sin, but also a hltor of faith. 
Introduction 
A number of philosophers and theologians of the twentieth century au-
daciously claimed that anxiety, despite occasioning the "£all" into sin, can 
also carve a path to creativity, courage, authenticity, or faith. This theme 
of the useful-or even "saving" -function of anxiety stems back to Ki-
erkegaard's phenomenological analysis in The Concept of Anxiety (1844). 
Like its twentieth century interpreters, The Concept of Anxiety! (hereafter: 
CA) distinguishes anxiety, the discontent over one's "ownmost" freedom 
and the seemingly unlimited possibilities accompanying it, from fear, 
the more determinate and transitory response associated with a specif-
ic threat or danger. Also like his interpreters, Kierkegaard suggests that 
the phenomenon of anxiety often occasions an individual's leap into sin, 
but also suggest that anxiety might awaken an individual from the sinful 
"spiritlessness" of "the crowd" and thus "educate [a person] unto faith" 
(CA 159). Even when they do not mention his name, the twentieth century 
figures who explore the benefit of anxiety "repeat" (in Kierkegaard's non-
identical sense) a theme that they receive from Kierkegaard. 
But this idea of the philosophical or spiritual benefit of anxiety is a 
difficult one to maintain. If the idea now seems like a vestige of the past 
century, this is perhaps due to the growth in unreflective (or even anti-
reflective) political discourse and civic religion. At least in the United 
States, the virtue of being unconditionally confident in one's moral 
and religious position currently overshadows and makes unrecogniz-
able the virtues of constant self-questioning, unease, and anxiety.2 And 
yet, while suspicion of anxiety is due largely to today's ethos, there are 
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also philosophical reasons to explain why the good of anxiety has faded 
from view. In the twentieth century, "proponents" of anxiety often either 
failed to convey the dangers of anxiety alongside its promises-thereby 
characterizing anxiety in ways that were not recognizable by those who 
experience it-or described anxiety's benefit so indeterminately as com-
pared to anxiety's threat that readers were only able to make sense of and 
remember anxiety's negative function. 
Heidegger and his theological counterpart, Paul Tillich, fall into the 
first hazard. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the distinctive way in 
which Dasein is disclosed through anxiety.3 Through anxiety, the individ-
ual senses that he or she is "not-at-home" in the world. Anxiety, with its 
sense of the "uncanny," calls the individual back from absorption into the 
inauthentic world of the mass-man to an authentic "Being-in-the-world." 
While much of this analysis is compelling, any theologian interested in 
the dynamics of sin should be suspicious of this unambiguously positive 
function of anxiety. Anxiety, for Heidegger, cannot harm to the degree 
ito which it can help, if only because, according to his ontology, human-
ity is always already "fallen" into inauthenticity, and has nowhere to go 
than "up." Tillich too tends to portray anxiety in wholly and inevitably 
'beneficial terms. His The Courage to Be4 suggests that anxiety is related 
to courage as non-being is related to Being. According to Tillich's ontol-
ogy, the first elements (anxiety, non-being) are derivative and produc-
tive of the second elements (courage, Being). Just as being includes and 
overcomes non-being in its own self-genesis, so too does courage depend 
on and overcome anxiety. In their portrayals of anxiety as "opening" an 
individual toward Being, both Tillich and Heidegger downplay the more 
"everyday" danger associated with anxiety-the danger of sin. 
The opposing pitfall characterizes the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and 
Edward Farley. Whereas Heidegger and Tillich portray anxiety in overly 
optimistic terms (and "overly-ontological" terms-especially for the post-
liberal theologian), Niebuhr portrays the dangers of anxiety in far more 
determinate, memorable and theological terms than he portrays anxiety's 
benefit. For Niebuhr, anxiety is "a permanent concomitant of freedom, 
[and] is thus both the source of creativity and a temptation to sin."s Notice 
here that whereas "temptation" and "sin" nicely fit within Niebuhr's Chris-
tian tradition, "creativity" does not. The connection between anxiety and 
Christian salvation appears much more ambiguous and circuitous than 
the connection between anxiety and sin. The late twentieth-century theo-
logian Edward Farley likewise writes of positive responses to anxiety-in-
cluding creativity, vitality and wonder-in ways that are less indebted to 
the Christian narrative than is their negative correlate-idolatry.6 Niebuhr 
and Farley thus give a theologically detailed account of the transition from 
anxiety to sin, but fail to describe the transition from anxiety to "creativ-
ity" or "wonder" in theologically compelling terms. We will return to the 
opposing pitfalls represented by Heidegger/Tillich and Niebuhr/Farley at 
the close of this paper. 
The limitations of these analyses may help account for why the benefit 
of anxiety has not yet gripped Western consciousness. The shortcomings, 
however, should not overshadow the fact that these figures do well to 
indicate the benefit of anxiety. Without some description of the benefit 
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of anxiety, and with it of the possibility of sin, the Christian theologian is 
hard pressed to distinguish the virtue of faith as a struggle against tempta-
tion and anxiety from the untested "innocence" of one who knows neither 
testing nor struggle. Today, when the Church appears to many as an artifi-
cial sanctuary from real-world trouble, it is imperative that Christian theo-
logians distinguish their visions of salvation and virtue from the wishes 
of the pusillanimous. This distinction between untested innocence and ro-
bust redemption has sometimes been expressed through the theme of felix 
culpa, or the fortunate Fall. Despite noteworthy variations, the felix culpa 
theme commonly articulates that the beatitude of salvation so surpasses 
the good of original innocence that the intervening sin comes to be known 
as "necessary" or even "happy."? The redeemed, having traveled through 
sin and suffering, are given an outstanding joy that justifies the Fall. How-
ever, as the term "justify" suggests, the theme of the fortunate Fall often 
entails the philosophical enterprise of theodicy (literally, "the justification 
of God"), an enterprise which theologians find increasingly problematic.s 
The fortune of anxiety-or what I will call felix fallibilitas-provides an 
alternative, more promising way to distinguish redemption from untested 
innocence. The acceptance of anxiety and the battle against sin's possibil-
ity might by themselves distinguish the mature krlight of faith from the 
presumed "innocence" of the uninitiated. 
In this paper I will develop and commend the benefits of anxiety, fal-
libility, and the possibility of sin to constructive Christian theology. (For 
the purposes of this proposal, these terms are functionally equivalent and 
overlap considerably: "fallibility" refers to the "non-coincidence"9 of an 
individual with herself that makes moral failure and self-transcendence 
possible; "anxiety" refers to the individual's experience of this non-coinci-
dence; and "the possibility of sin" refers to this experience as it is normally 
felt-as the possibility of failure.) Kierkegaard, like Heidegger and the 
others, understands that anxiety is both beneficial and ethically-religious-
ly dangerous. Unlike his twentieth-century heirs, Kierkegaard's descrip-
tion of the good of anxiety, or the fortune of fallibility, is neither vaguely 
humanistic nor incongruously ontological. It is rather-like his analysis 
of the negative, sinful response of fallibility-theological through and 
through. By adopting his conception, contemporary Christian theology 
is able to find in human anxiety not only the temptation to sin, but also a 
precursor to and tutor of faith. 
Before developing these initial suggestions more substantively, I must 
introduce one common interpretation of Kierkegaardian anxiety that this 
essay explicitly counters. Many have debated whether the anxiety within 
CA helps explain an individual's "leap" into sin. Philip Quinn's foundation-
al essay, "Does Anxiety Explain Original Sin?" began this trend. It was re-
sponded to by Gregory Beabout in his, "Does Anxiety Explain Hereditary 
Sin?"l0 These interpreters share my assumption that anxiety can be good. 
They, however, assume that the" goodness" of anxiety is found in the way 
that it helps explain the onset of sin. According to them, anxiety is a tool 
for theologians and philosophers of religion to retrospectively make sense 
of moral evil. In confining the positive function of anxiety to an explana-
tory principle, interpreters such as Quinn and Beabout not only overlook 
the more theologically peculiar and noteworthy function of anxiety; they 
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also distort that function by confining it within the enterprise of theodicy, 
broadly construed. Because these interpretive assumptions are frequent 
and powerful-not to mention illuminating of much of Kierkegaard's 
text-a good deal of my essay will question whether they do justice to the 
full complexity of Kierkegaard's analysis and rhetorical voice. 
The first section of this paper traces the relationship between the lure of 
anxiety and the leap of sin through the first part of CA. Here I argue that 
the text's conflicted narrative voice prevents the readers from aligning the 
phenomenology of anxiety with theological assertions about sin. The dual 
perspective and conflicting voices of CA thereby call into question discus-
sions of whether anxiety explains sin. In the second section, I turn explic-
itly to the interpretations of Beabout and Quinn in order both to exhibit 
that their investigations are misplaced and to reintroduce the alternative 
role of anxiety. In the final section, I develop the alternative understanding 
of fortunate fallibility (felix fallibilitas) by understanding CA in light of its 
brief final chapter, "Anxiety as Saving through faith," and then by situat-
ing CA beside Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus works. 
I. The Voices of Haufniensis 
Kierkegaard wrote The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orient-
ing Deliberation 011 the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin under the pseud-
onym Vigilius Haufniensis (the "Watchman over the Harbor") during 
his first authorship (the corpus up to and including Concluding Unscien-
tific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments). It is most commonly read as a 
psycho-theological investigation into original and subsequent sin, with 
"original" referring both to Adam's sin and the first sin of each individual. 
(Haufniensis takes pains not to place Adam "fantastically" outside hu-
man history. Adam-Hebrew for "the man" -is one of us, if also in ideal-
ized form.) Subtitle notwithstanding- CA is anything but "simple." The 
deliberation offers an extended phenomenological (or "psychological") 
account of human anxiety while gesturing toward the theological issue 
of hereditary sin. But the author also refuses to theorize how phenom-
enology and theology relate-how observing anxiety affects one's under-
standing (or confession) of sin. The work also entails an extended critique 
of "speculative" objectivity, but is ironically written through an observa-
tional psychologist-a "Watchman" -who "sits and traces the contours 
and calculates the angles of possibility," and who is "disturbed" no more 
than Archimedes (CA 23). 
Many scholars, including the two considered below, suppose that 
Haufniensis's observations about anxiety directly inform Kierkegaard's 
understanding of sin. This assumption is mistaken on two accounts. First, 
it assumes a false identity, or at least an unjustifiable degree of continuity, 
between Haufniensis as a poetized persona who authors CA and Kierkeg-
aard as a real person who "authors" Haufniensis. (The distinction between 
Kierkegaard and Haufniensis will become important when we contextu-
alize CA among Kierkegaard's other pseudonymous works.) Second, the 
assumption that the phenomenology of anxiety directly contributes to a 
Christian hamartiology (understanding of sin) overlooks or disregards the 
presence of two distinct, vying perspectives or "voices" that run through-
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out Haufniensis's text. These voices-one psychological/phenomenologi-
cal and the other theological-do not harmonize. Haufniensis's text reads 
like a dialogical pursuit through mixed metaphors and a shifting narra-
tive voice rather than as a univocal discourse from within methodological 
bounds. The narrator's voice is interdisciplinary, and therefore makeshift, 
and sometimes disjointed. One might even claim that a certain degree 
of "double talk" by Haufniensis reveals his own anxiety, despite his at-
tempts not to be disturbed (p. 23).11 If the phenomenology of anxiety and 
the doctrine of sin relate, it is only through the reciprocally-questioning 
antagonism between these psychological and dogmatic perspectives. In 
this section, I analyze the opening chapters of CA in order to highlight 
the tension between psychology'S description of the anxiety-laden context 
that makes sin possible and the theological (or "dogmatic") assertion that 
sin is only presupposed by sin.12 
The "theological" voice surfaces immediately in CA's Introduction as 
Haufniensis critiques the ethical-religious assumptions of Hegelian media-
tion, whether of Hegel or of Danish Hegelians.13 In particular, the author 
denounces the role that "the negative" plays in Hegelian metaphysics (pp. 
12-13). Haufniensis, like other Kierkegaardian personae, generally mocks 
the "illusion" through which the negative "brings movement into all things" 
(p. 12). He critiques Hegel for confusing the immanent movement of log-
ic, where every state is a transition and therefore merely "quantitatively" 
distinguished from every other state, with lived existence, where change 
requires a "transcendent" interruption, and where true becoming takes 
the form of a "qualitative leap."l-l Haufniensis even mockingly compares 
Hegel's ability to bring a qualitative state out of quantitative determinations 
to a children's rhyme where chanting "one-nis-ball, two-nis-balls, three-nis 
balls" will eventually bring about tennis balls (p. 32). But this ethereal and 
comical movement turns serious when it rolls into Hegel's ethics. "Here 
one is astonished to discover that the negative is evil," Haufniensis writes 
(p. 13). And so here "confusion is in full swing" (p. 13). Why is Haufnien-
sis particularly concerned with the association between "the negative" and 
"evil" and the way Hegelian mediation affects ethical-religious thought? 
The discrepancy involves the question of whether sin or moral evil 
can be understood as a mediating transition between ignorant innocence 
and redemptive knowledge. Sin as a "determinative negative"15 plays a 
fruitful role in Hegel's system. This can be seen from the way Hegel, in 
his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, interprets Genesis's narrative of 
the Fall as depicting (in revealed religion's Vorstellung, or "picture think-
ing") the transition from listless ignorance and immediacy to spirited 
self-consciousness. This "transition" into sin eventually brings about 
the self-identity of Absolute Knowing.16 Hegel here adheres to a robust 
and conceptualized version of felix cllipa. The Fall serves higher forms of 
knowing, justifying the slaughter bench of history. 
Haufniensis objects to this conception on ethical and theological 
grounds. By logically explaining the onset of sin, one justifies sin ethically, 
thereby assuaging guilt and bypassing the need for redemption. Even to 
situate sin within an overarching context-regardless of whether that con-
text comprises a "System" -threatens to lessen the severity of sin. Haufni-
ens is fears that to contexhlalize is to find reasons, to justify, and to excuse. 
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He insists that sin is an enigma that cannot be mediated by "the under-
standing."l? Put in Haufniensis's favorite terms, one cannot make sense of 
the leap into sin without reducing its "qualitative" uniqueness to "quan-
titative determinations." From this point onward in the text, Haufniensis 
consistently writes of sin as a "qualitative" interruption, a "sudden" and 
"'enigmatic" "leap." He does so in order to resist any understanding of sin 
that serves theodicy at the expense of moral condemnation and the need 
for Christian atonement. 
Such is the origin and tenor of Haufniensis's "theological" voice. But 
while this voice is present on nearly every page of CA, the text's primary 
:mbject matter is the concept of anxiety. And it is anxiety that Haufniensis, 
in a second, psychological voice, introduces as the "intermediate term" 
necessary for understanding how the choice to sin interrupts the state of 
innocence (p. 49). While the leap into sin is sudden and unforeseeable, 
anxiety provides a context out of which sin arises, seemingly assuaging 
the absoluteness of its interruption. Moreover, whereas the onset of sin is 
7ualitative, anxiety can grow in qualltitative terms. It increases in propor-
tion to the degree to which the object of anxiety-the "nothing" of sin's 
possibility-appears "more and more [as] a something" through inher-
ited sinfulness (p. 61). ("Sinfulness" for Haufniensis indicates the increased 
possibility for new and greater sin, not a condition or state of actual sin. 
Moreover, the "possibility of sin," as will become more clear, does not 
necessarily correspond to the probability of sinning, but points instead to 
a volitional possibility that can be become more or less available accord-
ing to the character of a moral agent. 1S) Through anxiety, then, the still 
innocent individual nonetheless "approaches" the leap into sin, and "in-
nocence is [thereby] brought to its uttermost" (p. 45). Haufniensis here 
seems to make sense of sin's actuality through sin's possibility by suggest-
ing that one's anxious relationship to one's freedom commonly (or even 
inevitably?) results in the choice to sin. If the theological voice condemns 
Hegel's mediation, the psychological voice introduces a "mediating" con-
cept between innocence and guilt-the concept of anxiety. 
It appears that a fault-line runs through Haufniensis's text. On the theo-
logical side, he repeatedly asserts that no quantitative determination prior 
to the leap into sin can lead up to or explain moral evil. Only confession of 
guilt" gets at" the nature of sin. On the psychological side, he nonetheless 
presents the phenomenon of anxiety as a way of situating or contextual-
izing this leap. Moreover, the psychological analysis of anxiety seems to 
mitigate against the theological condemnation of the sinner by suggesting 
that "the fall into sin always takes place in weakness" and that the one 
"who becomes guilty in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is 
possible to become" (p. 61). On the one side of the fault-line is the sudden 
"leap" -on the other a gradual "slide."19 On the one side is the qualitative 
interruption of a will-on the other human fallibility, which quantitatively 
increases and finally succumbs. Much of CA manically oscillates between 
voluntarism and infinite individual guilt for one's sin, on the one hand, and 
the recognition of freedom's limitations and of anxiety as an assuaging "ex-
planation" for sin, on the other. The relationship between these perspec-
tives is strained or even contentious, fundamentally and irreconcilably so. 
This fact must qualify any suggestion that anxiety "helps" to explain sin. 
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Many interpreters have overlooked these dual (and dueling) perspec-
tives, assuming that a methodological divide between psychology and 
dogmatics alleviates any tension between them. According to them, psy-
chology only understands how sin is possible by examining the anxiety 
that ensues when freedom considers its limitless possibility. Dogmatics 
then proclaims that sin is actual and demands that each individual claims 
full responsibility for it. Haufniensis's text can encourage such demarca-
tions. For example, the last paragraph of the work claims that "as soon as 
psychology has finished with anxiety, it is to be delivered to [at aflevere til] 
dogmatics" (p. 162). This might suggest complementariness between psy-
chology and dogmatics. Yet, the clause's connotations are rather telling. 
The Danish "at aflevere til" can mean "to be delivered to," as one would 
deliver a message. It can also mean to surrender, or to be forced to hand 
over. Such plurivocity makes the reader re-question whether the relation-
ship between psychology and dogmatics is not more strained, and more 
interesting, than many assume. The final paragraphs of the Introduction 
describe how psychology "becomes deeply absorbed in the possibility of 
sin, [until] it is unwittingly in the service of another science [theology, or 
"dogmatics"] that only waits for it to finish so that it can begin and assist 
psychology to the explanation" (p. 23, my emphasis). Here it appears as 
though theology overtakes psychology once it, thoroughly enamored, can 
offer little resistance. The "assistance" offered by theology looks more like 
a hostile takeover. 
But it is in the first two chapters of CA that the reader best hears the 
mixed metaphors and dissonant voices of Haufniensis. There Haufniensis 
gives his most famous description of anxiety and the onset of sin through 
the analogy of a person standing over an abyss, experiencing vertigo, and 
succumbing to dizziness. This re-narration of the Fall-although connect-
ed and coherent-includes two sets of images that lie on either side of the 
fault line that we have introduced. We quote the passage in full: 
Anxiety may be compared to dizziness. He whose eye [0ie] happens 
to [kommer til at] look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. 
But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in 
the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the 
dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit 
[viI scette] the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own pos-
sibility, laying hold [griber] of finiteness to support itself. Freedom 
succumbs [segner] in this dizziness. Further than this, psychology 
cannot and will not go. In that very moment [0ieblikke] everything 
is changed, and freedom, when it again rises, sees that it is guilty. 
Between these two moments is the leap, which no science has ex-
plained and which no science can explain. He who becomes guilty 
in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become. 
Anxiety is a feminine weakness in which freedom faints. Psychologi-
cally speaking, the fall into sin always takes place in weakness. But 
anxiety is of all things the most selfish. (p. 61) 
Throughout this passage Haufniensis uses two contrasting figures-the 
"eye" and" freedom" - as metonyms for the falling individual. Reference 
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to "the eye" portrays the failure in terms of being unable to withstand 
the anxious disequilibrium induced by the fathomless pit. Disequilib-
rium culminates in dizziness and fainting, neither of which suggests 
free choice of the will. This metaphor thus emphasizes the quantitative 
increase in anxiety that gradually overtakes a person. When Haufni-
ensis alternatively portrays the self as "freedom," he emphasizes the 
self's volition. Freedom has motivations and desires (it "wants to posit 
the synthesis") and so "lays hold" (gribe: to seize or clutch) of the fi-
nite for security. Whereas the eye indicates the passivity and perhaps 
inevitability of failure, freedom indicates the responsibility of the one 
who sins. Though the narrative is coherent, the metaphors within it are 
mixed or even competitive. Interestingly, the metonyms also exchange 
characteristics-without becoming unified. Haufniensis notes the eye's 
responsibility for the vertigo ("it is just as much in his own eye as in the 
abyss"), and emphasizes alternative choices ("for suppose he had not 
looked down"), even though he first described the eye as having ac-
cidentally "happen[ ed] to look down." Freedom too both "leaps" into 
sin and faints in "feminine weakness." It grasps after finitude but also 
'succumbs" to (segner: "drops" "sinks into") a dizziness that gets the 
best of it. 
Haufniensis here somewhat erratically conveys both the fallibility and 
the fault of sinners; he both condemns the one who falls and assuages his 
guilt; and he depicts moral failure as both a quantitative slide and a quali-
tative leap. Haufniensis even asserts that the purpose of such alternating 
depictions is to maximize ambiguity: "He who becomes guilty in anxiety 
becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become" (p. 61). The 
"moment" in which this Fall occurs expresses this ambiguity perfectly. 
Literally, the "moment" (0ieblikke) means a "blink of the eye." But in col-
loquial Danish it can also mean the eye's sideways glance, a brief looking 
away. One suggests a failure no more intentional than blinking or needing 
to sneeze. The other connotes an intentional diversion-the unwillingness 
to be attentive. 
If the disparate metaphors within Haufniensis's Fall narrative register 
his dissonant voices, those voices can be heard in other key passages as 
well. In the first chapter, the discord arises when Haufniensis describes 
the human choice to sin as without context or motivation before twice de-
nying that he is a Pelagian. In §2 Haufniensis speaks of sin presupposing 
itself, of "sin [coming] into the world by a sin" (p. 32). When "the under-
standing" wants to explain this circular self-presupposition, it gets more, 
not less, confused. Section 3 then shores up sin's self-presupposition by 
refusing to understand innocence as having an inner teleology toward be-
ing annulled (contra Hegel). Both sections emphasize that sin comes about 
through a freely chosen, qualitative leap that remains incommensurable 
with that which precedes it. Though consistent on this point, each sec-
tion concludes by appealing to a contrasting perspective. Haufniensis in-
troduces these appeals as a defense against the charge of Pelagianism-a 
charge which he assures the reader is entirely misplaced (pp. 34, 37). The 
aspect of Pelagianism pertinent here is the idea that individuals freely sin 
without influence from structures of society or patterns of history.2o The 
first protestation reads in full as follows: 
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It hardly needs to be said that this view is not guilty of Pelagianism, 
which permits every individual to play his little history in his own 
private theater unconcerned about the race. For the history of the 
race proceeds quietly on its course, and in this no individual begins 
at the same place as another, but every individual begins anew, and 
in the same moment he is at the same place where he should begin 
in history. (pp. 34-35) 
By admitting that the history of race changes each generation's starting 
point, Haufniensis strives to affirm the relevance of historical and collec-
tive circumstances. But it is not clear how the historical advance and mem-
bership in the human race qualifies an individual's decision. Haufniensis 
only retains the contrast between external influence and individual deci-
sion by distinguishing historical circumstance from the fact that "every 
individual [nonetheless] begins anew." 
In the second defense against Pelagianism, Haufniensis again holds 
divergent conceptions together by way of contrastive rhetoric: sinfulness 
increases, but innocence is only lost by a leap; one may be more or less 
disposed to sin, but this more or less cannot constitute the concept of guilt. 
His defense against Pelagianism appears not to change the fundamental 
nature of falling into sin or the way in which sin presupposes itself. Sin 
is explained by sin; this enigma remains indifferent if not impervious to 
supplemental, mediating explanations, just as the leap into sin remains 
undetermined by degrees of prior sinfulness. At best, theological asser-
tions about the interruption of sin and psychological observations about 
the increasing possibility of sin reciprocally delimit one another. They do 
not lead to reciprocal reformulations of the natures of sin and anxiety. 
Throughout the second chapter of CA, the author's rhetorical voices are es-
pecially telling: the more an increase in anxiety seems to assuage the enigma 
of sin, the more vehemently Haufniensis insists that it cannot or should not 
do so. Chapter Two focuses on postlapsarian (Haufniensis says" derived") 
individuals, and contrasts their situation with that of Adam (or with the 
first sin of each individual). He distinguishes each postlapsarian individual 
from Adam insofar as derived individuals can become anxious not only or 
especially over limitless possibility, or the "possibility of possibility' (p. 42), 
but also and frequently over the possibility of sin. Postlapsarian individu-
als perceive sin in the world and have a "presentiment' that they too will 
become sinners. They reflect on this possibility and become anxious about 
it. Whereas their presentiment and ensuing anxiety do not "cause" moral 
failure, they do seem to make sin "easier" (p. 60). Insofar as postlapsarian 
persons believe that they will fall, they de facto have already fallen. 
In this context, Haufniensis is fascinated by what he twice calls the 
"maximum" scenario. In such a situation, sin perpetuates itself, bypass-
ing as it were the interruption of an individual's volition. He describes the 
possible or ideal case in which" a person seems to become guilty merely 
through anxiety about himself, something that could not have happened in 
the case of Adam" (p. 53), or again, the case in which "an individual in anx-
iety about sin brings forth sin" (pp. 74-75). Such moral failure would seem 
like an easy transition: "The more reflective[ly] one dares to posit anxiety, 
the easier it may seem for anxiety to pass over [at slaac over] into guilt" (p. 
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60). At maximum, sin itself would bring about more sin-without a quali-
tative interruption. Haufniensis is fascinated with this worst-case scenario; 
he returns to it here and throughout his corpus under the figure of "the 
demonic." However, one notices that it is exactly in those places where 
Haufniensis imagines sin to be a self-perpetuating state that he most em-
phatically rejects this possibility. Indeed, he rejects it quite "dogmatically," 
i.e., without allowing the phenomenon of the slide into sin to influence his 
assertion. The voices of Haufniensis thus appear most dissonant in this 
chapter. Even as he presents the possibility of sin bringing about sin, he 
emphatically asserts on dogmatic grounds that this is impossible. 
For example, immediately after Haufniensis introduces the maximum 
case, he objects: 
It is nevertheless true that every individual becomes guilty only 
through himself; yet what is quantitative in his relation to the race in 
this case reaches its maximum here and will have the power to con-
fuse every view so long as one does not hold fast [fastholder] to the 
distinction specified earlier between the quantitative accumulation 
and the qualitative leap. (pp. 53-54) 
The reader must hold fast (fastholder) to the distinction between the quan-
titative and the qualitative precisely because the examination of the "pow-
er" of quantitative influence threatens to obscure it. And Haufniensis now 
can only reassert this distinction despite the ways the power of anxiety 
threatens to undermine it. 
A second assertion of individual responsibility despite the race's influ-
ence follows in a similar manner: 
The more reflective[ly] one dares to posit anxiety, the easier it may 
seem for anxiety to pass over into guilt. But here it is important not 
to allow oneself to be deluded by determinants of approximation: 
a "more" cannot bring forth the leap, and no "easier" can in truth 
make the explanation easier. If this is not held fast [Holder man ikke 
fast pass dette], one runs the risk of suddenly meeting a phenomenon 
in which everything takes place so easily that the transition becomes 
a simple transition .... Therefore, although anxiety becomes more 
and more reflective, the guilt that breaks forth in anxiety by the qual-
itative leap retains the same accountability as that of Adam, and the 
anxiety the same ambiguity. (p. 60) 
Notice again how Haufniensis implores the reader to hold fast (fastholder) 
to the distinction between qualitative sin and quantitative sinfulness, de-
spite (or because of?) certain evidence that threatens to obscure it. Even as 
Haufniensis the psychologist describes" a phenomenon in which every-
thing takes place so easily," i.e., where sinfulness seems to bring about sin, 
Haufniensis the dogmatist continually interrupts his phenomenological 
observations by asserting that sinfulness cannot bring about sin, increased 
ease cannot assuage responsibility, no quantitative "more" can bring 
about qualitative difference. If, in the introductory chapter, Haufniensis 
presented psychology and dogmatics as somewhat mutually supportive, 
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and if, in the first chapter, this relationship appeared mutually delimiting, 
then in this second chapter the relationship borders on becoming antago-
nistic. The two no longer dialogue or even debate; they profess and vie for 
predominance. One Haufniensis is fascinated with the manner by which 
anxious reflections over sinfulness can issue in sin. The other Haufniensis 
adamantly "sticks to" (fastholde) the categorical distinction between fal-
libility and fault. 
II. Anxiety Explains Nothing 
In entertaining the idea that anxiety could" explain" the leap into sin, Quinn 
and Beabout assume that psychology and theology are complimentary and 
that an advance in understanding anxiety amounts to an advance in un-
derstanding sin. The increasingly antagonistic dialectic between the mixed 
metaphors and two voices of Haufniensis that we traced in the preceding 
section undercuts this assumption. These interpreters speak with a voice 
that is more univocal, and less conflicted, than the rhetoric they consider.21 
According to Quinn, Haufniensis's presentation of anxiety as a "motiva-
tion" for sin seeks to explain how sin first arises. Quinn investigates how 
anxiety might explain sin without assuming that an adequate explanation 
must be cast in metaphysical terms. In his analysis, Haufniensis treads 
in medio ground between understanding sin as a causal necessity (which 
Quinn attributes to Schleiermacher) and renouncing all motivational fac-
tors and any ability to understand it (which Quinn attributes to Kant). 
Beabout extends Quinn's analysis by asking whether Hauh1.iensis's un-
derstanding of anxiety explains not only original sin but also the inheri-
tance of sinful conditions. In the second chapter of CA, Haufniensis uses 
anxiety to characterize the "possibility of activity taking part in a distorted 
social structure that is already in place."22 As we have seen, this possibility 
is "more developed" and "more concrete" than the possibilities available 
to Adam. It thereby becomes the object of a more developed and reflective 
anxiety. Beabout concludes that anxiety not only explains the leap from in-
nocence to guilt but also explains each subsequent leap from anxiety-pro-
ducing conditions, which make one predisposed to sin, to the sinful choic-
es themselves, which are made only through an individual's freedom. 
Quinn and Beabout thus focus on different aspects of the explanandum 
when judging whether anxiety explains sin. They share, however, the as-
sumption that the phenomenology of anxiety in CA primarily functions 
to explain sinful choices, whether original or postlapsarian. Beabout less 
ambiguously than Quinn gives a positive answer to his question, "Does 
Anxiety Explain Hereditary Sin?" On the one hand, Beabout denies no 
less than Haufniensis that anxiety necessitates sin. He thus writes of how 
"the sinfulness of previous generations can playa conditioning factor that 
influences the fall from innocence without compromising human free-
dom," and of how "anxiety is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
sin."23 Beabout is particularly careful to distinguish subsequent genera-
tions from Adam not in terms of sin becoming more probable, but in terms 
of its possibility becoming "more concrete" or "more developed."24 Most 
commendable is his conceptual distinction between offering a "causal ex-
planation" and a "transcendental explanation" for sin.25 Beabout claims 
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that the accumulated sinfulness of the race and the increasingly reflective 
capacities of individuals "explain" sin by providing the transcendental 
ground of sin's possibility. 
On the other hand, Beabout often coordinates the influence of quantita-
tive determinants with qualitative freedom in ways which strict transcen-
dental deduction would disallow. He suggests that the socio-historical en-
vironment and an individual's freedom together account for his or her fall 
:into sin. He writes: 
These increases in quantity [of sinfulness and anxiety] affect each 
new innocent individual, though they do not qualitatively change 
the innocent individual. This means that for each individual, though 
the person is born into an environment with others who are them-
selves sinners and into a distorted social context, it is not the parents, 
the environment, or the social context alone that causes the innocent 
person to sin .... The fact that there is an increased quantity of sin 
and anxiety in the world ... is not alone what caused the person to 
sin .... [Rather] the individual who is guilty is always, at least in part, 
responsible for his or her sinfulness.26 (my emphases) 
This passage begins by repeating Haufniensis's rejection of the claim that 
an increase in quantity can cause a qualitative leap. It ends, however, by 
suggesting that together quantitative influences and qualitative freedom 
account for sin. The phrases italicized above suggest not only that respon-
sibility for sin is shared between an individual and his or her environment, 
but also that the increase in sinfulness in part causes the fall into sin. Be-
about repeats such phrasing throughout his articleY Even his final sen-
tence, which otherwise reiterates individual responsibility for sin, ends up 
dispersing the causes of and responsibility for sin between the individual 
and his or her social context: "While quantitative changes may alter the 
setting and texture of the first sin of subsequent individuals, it is still the 
case that the qualitative change from innocence to guilt occurs in anxiety, 
and hence remains, at least in part, the responsibility of the individual" 
(myemphasis).28 
By treating quantitative determinations and qualitative freedom as 
sharing responsibility and causality, Beabout implies that they are com-
mensurable. He thus treats the difference between the quantitative and 
the qualitative in quantifiable terms. Each is allotted a "part" of sin's ex-
planation. Not surprisingly, when the qualitative leap is (quantitatively) 
coordinated with the quantitative in this way, it looses its distinctive char-
acter. The individual is responsible "at least in part" because the environ-
ment cannot "wholly determine" the Fall into sin. If one follows Beabout's 
interpretation of Haufniensis, the qualitative leap becomes a small factor 
that is "added" to socio-historical circumstances so that they do not ex-
plain sin away. 
Quinn is much less susceptible than Beabout to "reducing" qualitative 
distinctions to quantitative differences. Unlike Beabout, he equivocates in 
his answer to the question of whether anxiety explains original sin. Also 
unlike Beabout, he refuses to invoke individual freedom to fill in the re-
mainder after psychology has tried to explain sin. Instead, he emphasizes 
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that psychology, not dogmatics, offers only a "little help."29 On the whole, 
a phenomenological account of anxiety cannot explain sin; it only helps to 
distinguish the freedom to fall from utterly unmotivated liberum arbitrium. 
Quinn's conception, however, still indicates a direct or complementary re-
lationship between psychological explanations and dogmatic assertions 
that is precluded by the conflicting voices of Haufniensis. 
According to Quinn's typology, Haufniensis shares Kant's resistance to 
the idea that social and historical factors can explain the enigma of sin. He 
departs from Kant, however, by permitting psychological factors, includ-
ing motivations and commitments, to influence a person's fall into sin. 
Like Schleiermacher, Haufniensis recognizes that the individual inherits 
conditions which are anterior to pure freedom and which occasion or in-
fluence the leap into sin. Unlike Schleiermacher, however (and here back 
toward Kant), such influences can never impel one to sin. For Haufniensis 
the moral vulnerability preceding free choice provides a necessary but 
radically insufficient condition for explaining the onset of sin. 
Quinn concludes that" anxiety does not explain original sin."30 This con-
clusion, however, fails to convey the degree to which Quinn tries to locate 
the "little help" that psychology offers. He finds that help and the proper 
function of anxiety in the way it prevents one from interpreting the leap 
into sin as beginning from a place of indifference. Quinn writes, "What 
anxiety is supposed to do for us is to preclude the possibility that the quali-
tative leap is made from a position of indifference, utterly unmotivated."31 
In a passage to which we will return, Haufniensis does reject the 
thought that sin could be chosen through freedom of indifference (pp. 
49-50). But Quinn and Haufniensis reject liberum Ilrbitrium on different 
grounds. Quinn associates indifferent freedom with Kant's description of 
an individual's a-temporal adoption of a morally evil maxim. In his earlier 
analysis of Kant and original sin, Quinn confesses his "intellectual dis-
comfort" with such abstract freedom: 
Even if one agrees with Kant that such [social and historical] fac-
tors cannot be causally sufficient for the existence of a propensity for 
which its possessor is to be held morally responsible, it seems reason-
able to feel intellectual discomfort with the idea that they are pre-
cluded from having any causal influence in moral character. Worse 
still, it is hard to see how Kant could allow even psychological factors 
to influence the atemporal choice that produces the evil propensity.32 
Quinn nowhere explains his "intellectual discomfort" or why such dis-
comfort "seems reasonable." He only appeals to readers' presumed sus-
picion of Kant's "unhistorical and individualistic" thought, and to their 
supposed uneasiness about uninfluenced, unmotivated freedom. 
Has not Quinn, when appealing to the discomfort that arises with the 
thought of an unmotivated will, already decided how qualitative voli-
tion and quantitative determinations might correspond? He implies that 
to leave them utterly unrelated (or to understand them as qualitatively 
distinct) would offend human understanding. When Quinn appeals to 
feelings of discomfort for evidence against context-less volition, he thus 
allows reason in general or phenomenological psychology in particular 
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to judge the validity of theological claims. Though he remains more at-
tentive than Beabout to the ambiguous relationship between psychology 
and dogmatics and between quantitative determinants and the qualitative 
leap, Quinn - by insisting on the little service which psychology might 
offer theology-risks judging dogmatic propositions according to human 
experience and thus contextualizing the qualitative leap within quantita-
tive progressions. 
In the final analysis, Quinn shares with Beabout the assumption 
that psychological analyses of quantitative determinants overstep their 
bounds only when they fully explain the leap into sin. So long as they 
leave significant room (Quinn) or at least a little space (Beabout) for hu-
man volition, they avoid "psychologizing" sin and mitigating individual 
responsibility. The assumption of Haufniensis, as glimpsed in his con-
flicted rhetoric, differs significantly. For him, the struggle between psy-
chology and theology is a struggle over which gets to be in charge. If 
psychology helps explain sin, then the leap begins to look less like an im-
measurable gulf and more like a wide distance made progressively nar-
rower when one attends to socio-historical factors. Haufniensis writes, 
'[anxiety] no more explains the qualitative leap than it can justify it ethi-
cally" (I" 49). Even by helping to explain the leap into sin, psychology 
risks turning sin into something that it is not: ethically justifiable. And so, 
even and especially when Haufniensis considers the help of psychology, 
Haufniensis the theologian dogmatically insists on its necessary inade-
quacy: "The only science that can help a little is psychology, yet it admits 
that it explains nothing and also that it cannot and will not explain more" 
(1'.51, original emphasis). 
In this light, explanations for sin risk the same ethical distortions as 
does Hegel's speculative standpoint. However tenuous their conclusions, 
they are oriented toward the past and motivated by the desire to concep-
tually align the Fall into sin with the "normal" course of events. In short, 
they risk becoming theodicies, in the pejorative sense of that word. More 
perilous still, explanations for sin might conceal self-justification within 
seemingly unmotivated justifications of God - theod icy might mask anthro-
l'0dicy.33 Haufniensis at least suspects that scholarly investigations that try 
to explain sin conceal a hidden agenda. Some will stave off the need to 
confess sin by continuing to explain it. 
None of this is to say that Haufniensis or any of Kierkegaard's personae 
makes theological claims without appealing to socio-historical or psycho-
logical observations. It is only to say that the interests of psychology are 
controlled by theological interests, and not vice-versa. By ignoring the 
conflicted voice of Haufniensis, interpreters have assumed, first, that psy-
chology could help dogmatic understandings of sin without also threat-
ening to undermine them, and second, that Christian theology should 
welcome such assistance without radical re-appropriation. The effect of 
these assumptions is to make Haufniensis's interpretation of anxiety and 
sin appear as a watered-down version of Hegel's theodicy. On this view, 
sin is not necessary, but it is perhaps inevitable. Anxiety does not take one 
into sin, but it does lead one right up to it. Quantitative transitions cannot 
induce a qualitative leap, but they can help make sense of it. Haufnien-
sis would be uncomfortable sitting so close to Hegel. There is therefore 
268 Faith and Philosophy 
reason to believe that anxiety and quantitative progression play a role 
clearly distinguished from "leading" to and so "explaining" sin. The final 
section of this essay examines how CA proposes an alternative, but no 
less positive, function of anxiety. 
III. The Benefit oj Sin's Possibility 
As we have seen, Haufniensis directly protests speculation about how 
innocence necessarily leads to sin and sin to redemptive knowledge. 
Through the progressive dissonance of his two voices, he also undercuts 
interpretive assumptions that would back away from a speculative theo-
dicy but still understand anxiety as approaching and therefore explain-
ing sin. The problem remains as to the relationship between Haufniensis's 
descriptions of anxiety, or quantitative increase in sin's possibility, on the 
one hand, and the range of possible responses by the reader, on the other. 
If increasing anxiety is not meant to explain sin, what is meant to do? 
The aim of this section is to propose an alternative reading of CA that is 
both encouraged and truncated by Haufniensis. It also forwards a central 
conviction shared by Beabout and Quinn but overlooked by other inter-
preters, namely, that the anxiety depicted in CA is beneficial. My interpre-
tation claims that the possibility of sin is presented to the reader so that 
he or she might overcome it in developing freedom and turning to faith. 
Haufniensis mentions the possibility that anxiety, "when rightly used ... 
plays another role" (p. 53) and periodically correlates anxiety with the 
possibility of religious faith. He clearly portrays anxiety as a condition of 
faith's possibility in his final chapter: "Anxiety as Saving through Faith." 
Might not CA as a whole present anxiety-producing possibilities to sin as 
that through which or against which one builds faith? 
Recall that the interpretations I have rejected suggest that qualitative 
sin and quantitative anxiety are commensurate, or quantitatively relat-
able. The alternative is to imagine that qualitative freedom employs and 
controls quantitative anxiety according to its own purposes. Haufniensis 
sometimes suggests as much, noting that anxiety can be used by individu-
als to strengthen and shape their freedom. For example, having described 
the way the "nothing" that instigates anxiety becomes "more and more a 
something" (or how indeterminate possibility becomes the possibility to 
sin), Haufniensis declares, "All of this is only for freedom, and it is only as 
the single individual himself posits sin by the qualitative leap" (p. 61, orig-
inal emphasis). The comment is cryptic, but Haufniensis implies that the 
purpose of anxiety only becomes relevant as one takes responsibility for 
positing sin. He thus also implies that the struggle between observation 
of quantitative progression and responsibility for the qualitative leap gets 
resolved only when the former submits to the latter. Haufniensis may be 
suggesting what Paul Ricoeur will state no less cryptically in the following 
century-that "he who confesses that he is the author of evil discovers the 
reverse of that confession, namely, the non-posited in the positing of evit 
the always already there of evit the other of temptation."34 Only through 
the confession of full responsibility for sin do the possibilities leading to 
sin become relevant. Anxiety becomes meaningful and purposeful only to 
the repentant sinner. 
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In other places, Haufniensis more explicitly suggests that the progres-
sion of anxiety is good insofar as it provides resistance against which one 
develops his or her freedom. The following passage describes the slide 
into sin as that which is meant to be overcome: 
Christianity has never assented to giving each particular individual 
the privilege of starting from the beginning in an external sense. 
Each individual begins in an historical nexus, and the consequences 
of nature hold true. The difference, however, [between Christianity 
and paganism] consists in that Christianity teaches him to lift him-
self above this "more," and it judges him who does not do so as be-
ing unwilling. (p. 73) 
Occasions to sin are here beneficial insofar as they might are surmounted. 
One might infer that all the quantitative progressions that Haufniensis 
considers-the accumulation of sinfulness in the race, the "nothing" of 
possibility becoming more and more of a "something," the advancing 
anxiety which seems to lead right up to sin-might provide that which 
Christians must actively resist. Notice that Haufniensis does not merely 
suggest that increasing anxiety cannot make one sin. He also and more 
boldly suggests that anxiety can help the earnest develop faith. In the lat-
ter scenario, fallibility, anxiety, and the possibility of sin function much 
as the Fall functions for Hegel. They initiate a transformation from igno-
rant and untested "innocence" to spirited and intentional faith. In place 
of Hegel's felix culpa, Haufniensis thus begins to develop a strong version 
of what might be called felix fallibilitas. The human capacity to sin that 
denotes finite freedom and that elicits subjective anxiety is "necessary" 
or even "happy" -insofar as the individual actively resists it. Yet, the dif-
ferences between Haufniensis and Hegel must not be obscured by the 
analogous role of fallibility and Fall. Haufniensis recognizes the positive 
function of anxiety, but he does so without exhibiting a "false mood" -the 
self-justification risked by theodicy-to which Hegel and interpreters of 
CA are prone. To better glimpse the novelty and irony of fortunate fal-
libility, we return to Haufniensis's critique of feigned objectivity, which 
encompasses a critique of "indifferent" freedom. 
The recognition that anxiety might serve freedom and faith depends 
on a standpoint that is more committed than is neutral observation. Hauf-
niensis asserts that the proper mood for dealing with sin is "courageous 
resistance" and contrasts such resistance with the wrong mood of psy-
chology's "antipathetic curiosity" (p. 15). Given this fact, one wonders 
whether Haufniensis rejects liberum arbitrium not because he, like Quinn, 
finds it offensive to reason, but because he suspects that people who hy-
pothesize about unmotivated volition do so to obfuscate their motivations 
and self-justifications. The passage in which Haufniensis critiques free-
dom of indifference suggests exactly this. Although he begins by calling 
such freedom absurd (a "nuisance for thought"), he ends by connecting it 
to the avoidance of earnest self-examination: 
If sin has come into the world by necessity (which is a contradiction), 
there can be no anxiety. Nor can there be any anxiety if sin came into 
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the world by an act of an abstract liberum arbitrium (which no more 
existed in the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it 
is a nuisance for thought). To want to give a logical explanation of the 
coming of sin into the world is a stupidity that can occur only to people 
who are comically worried about finding an explanation. (pp. 49-50) 
By rejecting this cognitive nuisance Haufniensis certainly refuses to reduce 
freedom to the muscular effort of pure volition.35 But he also traces belief 
in freedom of indifference to a worried (i.e., concerned, interested) attempt 
to find logical explanations for sin. In an earlier draft of CA Kierkegaard 
further characterizes those individuals who anxiously justify themselves 
under the shroud of theodicy. They who are "comically worried about 
finding an explanation" for sin are also 
indifferent to the fact that the explanation is so inhuman that no per-
son who has lived or who wishes to live can understand it because it 
also proposes to explain him. If the explanation of Adam and his fall 
does not concern me as a fabula, quae de me narratur [story that speaks 
to met one might as well forget both Adam and the explanation.36 
Explanations of sin propagated from third-person, seemingly uncon-
cerned points of view not only fail to "capture" the reason for sin; they 
also ensnare the explainer, exposing his or her quest as motivated by the 
avoidance of personal responsibility, confession and resistance. 
It is therefore in his ridicule of speculative theodicy - and in the accom-
panying critique of "indifferent" freedom-that Haufniensis commends 
anxious fallibility in a way that differs starkly from Hegel's justification 
of moral evil. But the relationship between the two is even more com-
plex. Haufniensis's fortunate fallibility actually turns Hegel's fortunate 
Fall inside-out since it is the security accompanying speculative know-
ing that Haufniensis seeks to make anxious. To understand how Haufni-
ensis parodies Heget we must consider CAts examination of the allegedly 
anxiety-free state of "spiritlessness" (pp. 93-96). 
Spiritless individuals-or rather, masses of people that resist becom-
ing individuals-are "neither guilty nor not guilty" (94). According to The 
Sickness Unto Death, they are "too spiritless to be called sin/,37 and it is 
difficult to know whether they are better or worse off than the self-con-
scious sinner. Kierkegaard refers to them in different ways at different 
times. They are "the crowd/' "Christendom/' "Speculation/' "the present 
age/' "philistines" and-most pointed and encompassing-the "spirit-
less" (Aandloshed).38 Haufniensis places in the category those who try to 
examine sin objectively in order to divert attention from their guilt and 
to evade the task of resisting sin. His language here becomes "singularly 
direct"39 as he mocks with renewed seriousness the profound comedy of 
spiritlessness, its mindless idolatry, the senselessness of its chatter and the 
superficiality of its bliss. At first glance, the spiritless are "innocent" in-
sofar as they remain uncommitted to the task of becoming spirit and so 
skirt the categories of responsibility and guilt. On closer inspection, they 
are guilty of masquerading as innocent or of fantasizing about a return to 
Eden. Through self-deception and the avoidance of anxiety these Christian 
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pagans of Christendom "never [arrive] at sin in the deepest sense" (p. 93). 
Haufniensis is quick to add: "yet this is precisely sin" (p. 93). 
The predominant characteristic of spiritlessness is its lack of manifest 
anxiety: "In spiritlessness there is no anxiety, because it is too happy, too 
content, and too spiritless for that" (p. 95). Those who lack spirit also lack 
anxiety and the possibility to sin. In light of this particular diagnosis, 
Haufniensis's prescribed treatment becomes clear: a heavy dose of anxiety 
to revive the comatose spirit. Interpreter Vanessa Rumble describes the 
treatment in telling terms: 
Spiritlessness, having lost its sense of the task which is posed to hu-
man existence by freedom, must be reinitiated into anxiety, the first 
signal of the awakening of freedom and consciousness of possibility. 
The usefulness of Haufniensis's portrayal of anxiety lies in its power 
not only to describe but also to produce anxiety. The implicit de-
mand of The Concept of Anxiety to its readers is to become anxious.4o 
Spiritless persons must become anxious, capable of sin for perhaps the 
first time. 
The brief but pivotal attention that Haufniensis pays toward the spirit-
less manifests the benefit of anxiety vis-a-vis the condition of spiritless-
ness. The spiritless are doubly-removed from Christian practice-what 
Kierkegaard calls "the radical cure" -and so must become capable of sin-
ning before learning to resist sin and trust the Physician's guidance. Like 
Hegel, then, Haufniensis urges a break with "innocence." Contra Hegel, 
this innocence is not the innocence that precedes moral evil but the pre-
sumed innocence that is willed by the cowardly in order to evade responsi-
ble commitment. In fact, according to Haufniensis (and Kierkegaard), it is 
exactly the disengaged objectivity of speculation (Hegelian or otherwise), 
together with the collusion of religion and culture, that sustains the self-
delusions of the spiritless. In attempting to fissure this "innocence" -to 
"wound it from behind"41- Haufniensis turns Hegel's felix culpa upon it-
self. The self-security of those who have justified their sin itself must be 
called into question. Becoming anxious and capable of sin is in this case 
good, or even "happy": 0 Felix Fallibilitas. 
The seemingly obvious culmination of this line of thinking is the con-
cluding chapter of CA: "Anxiety as Saving through Faith" (pp. 155-62). In 
it, Haufniensis personifies anxiety as the educator of humanity. He again 
specifies the spiritless as those in need of this treatment. For them, enter-
ing into anxiety without succumbing to it requires a double-movement of 
faith: to "sink absolutely" in anxiety and then "emerge from the depth of 
the abyss" and "receive everything back, as no one in actuality ever did" 
(pp. 156-58).42 The depths of freedom and possibility, which previously 
occasioned vertiginous anxiety, now promise to save all. Interestingly, 
when Haufniensis here returns to his analogy of vertigo, the dizziness of 
limitless possibility rescues those who are falling rather than occasions 
their original Fall. He writes: 
In actuality, no one ever sank so deep that he could not sink deeper, 
and there may be one or many who sank deeper. But he who sank 
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in possibility-his eye became dizzy, his eye became confused, so he 
could not grasp the measuring stick that Tom, Dick, and Harry hold 
out as a saving straw to one sinking; his ear was closed so he could 
not hear what the market price of men was in his own day, did not 
hear that he was just as good as the majority. He sank absolutely, but 
then in turn he emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all 
the troublesome and terrible things in life. (p. 158) 
Dizziness-along with possibility and anxiety-is now considered fortu-
nate. Immediately after this passage, Haufniensis admits that those who 
sink in possibility risk "the danger of a fall, namely suicide" (pp. 158-59). 
Yet this aside hardly diminishes the profit of "whoever is educated [by 
anxiety]" (p. 159). If the journey into anxiety is dangerous, its payoff is 
immeasurable: "Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has 
learned the ultimate" (p. 155). 
This final chapter appears to bring to fruition the upbuilding function 
of anxiety. However, while Haufniensis does write of anxiety in honorific 
terms, he also here noticeably disconnects anxiety from fallibility and the 
possibility of sin. Simply put, Haufniensis ostensibly disentangles the ben-
efit of anxiety from the possibility of sin. He does so by coupling anxiety 
almost exclusively with possibility as such rather than with the determi-
nate possibility to sin. Recall that Haufniensis earlier had traced the pro-
gression from Adam's objectless anxiety to the more determinate anxiety 
over the possibility of sin, as experienced by "derived" individuals. One 
would expect CA's final chapter to value the latter form of anxiety, since it 
this anxiety that is available to the reader. Yet in the final chapter the fact 
that "in possibility all things are equally possible" (p. 156) alone awakens 
the spiritless from their narrow bliss. As we have seen, the imagery of 
"absolutely" sinking into an indeterminate abyss of formal possibility is 
predominant. These images recall (and revise) the pure case scenario of 
Adam but not the different situation of all other "derived" persons, for 
whom possibility presents itself as the possibility to sin. 
H it were one's possibility to sin which must be confronted and resisted, 
then language of "struggling" with the infinite and" overcoming" anxiety 
would become predominant in Haufniensis's conclusion. As it is, meta-
phors of struggling are overshadowed by images of remaining in anxiety 
and refraining from securing oneself, trusting that one will emerge victori-
ous. This limitation may be the result of Haufniensis's own detached objec-
tivity and his fear of duplicating the anxiety he investigates. Whatever the 
origin, the celebration of anxiety in the final short chapter noticeably dif-
fers in tone and breadth from Haufniensis's more careful, circumspect de-
scriptions. This disconnect is problematic for those of us wishing to tracing 
Haufniensis's concept of felix fallibilitas. Specifically, it tempts interpreters 
into one of the two pitfalls that we described in our initial examination of 
Heidegger, Tillich, Niebuhr, and Farley. For if, with the final chapter, one 
portrays anxiety as educative (p. 155), masterful (p. 158), serving (p. 159), 
nurturing (pp. 160-61), or even salvific (pp. 158, 162), one risks obscuring 
the more obvious danger of sin's possibility, repeating the shortcoming of 
Tillich and Heidegger. If, by contrast, one attends to the manifold perils 
of anxiety that comprise most of the book, dismissing the final chapter as 
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rhetorical flourish, one confines the religious function of anxiety to its role 
in occasioning sin, repeating the limitations of Niebuhr and Farley. 
IV From Haufniensis to Anti-Climacus 
Happily, CA was not the only book that a fictitious persona through Ki-
erkegaard wrote. The Anti-Climacus writings of Kierkegaard's "second 
authorship" receive and develop Haufniensis's suggestions concerning 
the fortune of fallibility. They do not resolve the tension between falli-
bility's dangers and benefits, but they do further negotiate that tension 
and make increasingly clear that individuals must freely confront and 
outwit the possibility of sin. Together, The Sickness Un to Death and Practice 
in Christianity commend the battle against sin's possibility without either 
downplaying the danger of anxiety or forgetting its benefit. While my 
comments comprise only a sketch, they outline the ideal, theological role 
of anxiety, once it is fully "handed over" to dogmatics. 
The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuild-
ing and Awakening is the first of two works by Anti-Climacus (Kierkeg-
aard's persona of a "Christian on an extraordinarily high degree"). In it 
the author repeatedly asks in different ways: "Is despair an excellence or 
a defect?" (SD p. 14). While the destructiveness of despair (or sin) is more 
obvious (it is a "sickness unto death"), its excellence is supported where 
Anti-Climacus writes of a "despair that is a thoroughfare to faith" (p. 67) 
and asserts that "it is the worst misfortune never to have had that sick-
ness: it is truly a godsend to get it, even if it is the most dangerous of ill-
nesses, if one does not want to be cured of it" (p. 26). The "regression" into 
intensified sin, Anti-Climacus suggests, may be more valuable than the 
cloistered life that never meets the possibility of sin-the life that is "too 
Epiritless to be called sin" (p. 101). 
Some have argued that Anti-Climacus here develops a unique version 
of the fortunate FallY This claim overlooks Anti-Climacus's categorical 
distinction between the possibility and actuality of sin. Initially treating 
sin under the category of despair, Anti-Climacus writes: 
Is despair an excellence or a defect? Purely dialectically, it is both. If 
only the abstract idea of despair is considered, without any thought 
of someone in despair, it must be regarded as a surpassing excel-
lence. The possibility of this sickness is man's superiority over the 
animal, and this superiority distinguishes him in quite another way 
than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublim-
ity, that he is spirit. (SD p. 15) 
Clearly, Anti-Climacus considers the possibility of despair/sin to be good 
or even "excellent." He contends that "to be able to despair is an infinite 
advantage, and yet to be in despair is not only the worst misfortune and 
misery-no, it is ruination" (p. 15). 
Sickness specifically extends the insights of CA by differentiating be-
tween the passive absence of sin and the intentional cultivation and then 
destruction of sin's possibility. The "innocent" (read: "spiritless") may be 
without sin, but only the righteous have sought and fought its possibility: 
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Not to be in despair is not the same as not being lame, blind, etc. If 
not being in despair signifies neither more nor less than not being in 
despair, then it means precisely to be in despair. Not to be in despair 
must signify the destroyed possibility of being able to be in despair; 
if a person is truly not to be in despair, he must at every moment 
destroy the possibility. (SD p. 15) 
Throughout the book Anti-Climacus portrays the battle that belongs to 
"Christian heroism" (p. 5). The struggle to "destroy" the possibility of sin 
after having faced it distinguishes the knight of faith from more resigned 
or stoic forms of moral education, as exemplified by Haufniensis's final 
chapter. Two characteristics of this text thus distinguish it from Heidegger 
and Tillich, and from CA's conclusion. First, the descriptions by Anti-
Climacus of the fight against sin's possibility imply that salvation must 
be won over-and-against the danger of sin. Indeed, all of Sickness traces 
the manifold possibilities for failure in order that they be used -despite 
themselves-for "upbuilding and awakening." Second, the fact that Sick-
ness is an explicitly Christian work suggests that the benefit of sin's pos-
sibility only becomes available or manageable from within a particular 
tradition that forms a particular kind of religious courage. This flies in the 
face of Heidegger's understanding of anxiety-and to a lesser extent, that 
of Tillich - because Heidegger assumes that the most revelatory anxiety 
is indeterminate and ontological rather than determinate and ontic.44 For 
Kierkegaard, the strongest form of freedom is shaped-through its resis-
tance-by determinate possibilities to sin. 
Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus's second work, meditates on the 
further potentiation and determination of sin's possibility that ensues 
when an individual stands coram Christi. The reader of Practice learns that 
the greatest spiritual danger-the possibility of taking offense at Christ-
is also a necessary component of Christian faith. Anti-Climacus writes: 
Just as the concept of "faith" is an altogether distinctively Christian 
term, so in turn is "offense" an altogether distinctively Christian 
term related to faith. The possibility of offense is the crossroad, or it 
is like standing at the crossroad. From the possibility of offense, one 
turns either to offense or to faith, but no one comes to faith except 
through the possibility of offense.<ho 
If we exchange for "offense" the more general "sin," the final clause of 
this passage spells out what CA only sketches-that the possibility of sin 
can pave the way to faith. Yet the crossroads analogy misleads insofar as it 
suggest that one merely "stands" on the possibility of offense, unconcern-
edly choosing between sin and faith. Anti-Climacus clarifies that the pos-
sibility of offense/sin provides "the repulsion [Frast0d] in which faith can 
corne into existence-if one does not choose to be offended" (PC p. 121).46 
This repulsing possibility helps shape Christian faith as a particular kind 
of courageous struggle. 
Practice specifically extends CA by claiming that the possibility of sin 
is a gift from God. It claims that even the most severe temptation-the 
possibility of taking offense-is given by God for the purpose of being 
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defeated. More significant stilt it claims that this gift of sin's possibility is 
given not only with the first gifts of creation, but also and completely with 
the gift of Christ and his offer of forgiveness. For Anti-Climacus, Christ 
himself becomes and remains the sign of offense in order also to be the ob-
ject of faith (PC pp. 98-99). Whereas ideal Christian existence is classically 
characterized as non posse peccare (the impossibility of sin), Anti-Climacus 
characterizes it as posse peccare potentissme-the possibility of sin potenti-
ated by Christ to the highest power. Blessed is the one who is not offended 
by the particularity of Christ and his unbounded forgiveness-having 
first recognized the scandalous possibility of offense. 
Unlike Niebuhr and Farley, Anti-Climacus thus writes of the benefit of 
sin's possibility in ways that are centrally theological, and even Christo-
logical. Anxious fallibility accompanies the gift of Christ, and overcoming 
it belongs to the work of Christian redemption. Together the works by 
Anti-Climacus can expound on what Haufniensis proposes, and can do so 
because they understand the anxiety-producing possibilities to sin" dog-
matically" -as that which shall be encountered and destroyed. 
I hope that evoking the works of Anti-Climacus in response to the limita-
tions of Haufniensis does not seem like lowering a deus ex machina. The later 
works do not solve a problem of CA, but gesture toward the service that fal-
libility and the possibility of sin increasingly give to theology once it "takes 
over" the findings of psychology. I hope too that drawing together two Ki-
erkegaardian pseudonyms does not seem to conflate the various authorial 
perspectives. If anything, it helps to highlight important differences in the 
authorship between plural and singular voices, non-committed and con-
fessional perspectives, and stoic endurance and Christian courage. I have 
shown that Kierkegaard shares with Hegel the conviction that full human 
flourishing surpasses the goal of "innocence." Unlike Hegel-indeed, as a 
Hegelian inversion - Kierkegaard resists the speculative standpoint, with 
its ability to "grasp" a fortunate Fall. Those who have secured themselves 
through philosophical-religious knowing should become fallible, anxious, 
and capable of sin, if they too wish to surpass the entrapments of false 
innocence. In order to pass from untested innocence to robust righteous-
r;,ess, Christians need no more and no less than the possibility of sin - a gift 
which they accept by destroying, as they courageously cling to Christ.47 
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